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Balancing Ease and Accuracy in Assessing
Pharmaceutical Exclusion Payments
Herbert Hovenkamp,t Mark D. Janis,"
and Mark A. Lemley. t.
As Daniel Crane suggests,1 law must often choose between
simple rules that are prone to error and more complex rules
that are more accurate but harder to administer.2 Often, but
not always. Sometimes the simple rule gets it right. The rule of
presumptive illegality adopted by the Sixth Circuit in the case
of pharmaceutical exclusion payments3 is such a case.
Crane argues that exclusion payments will sometimes be
socially optimal and should therefore be judged under the rule
of reason. In short, he argues that presumptive illegality is
overinclusive.4 Crane's argument fails on two levels. First, his
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1. See Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settle-
ments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 698 (2004) [hereinafter Crane]; see generally Daniel
A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Anti-
trust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 750 (2002) (argu-
ing that the optimal rule should yield the lowest net social cost by balancing
interests in competition, innovation, and settlement).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD
(1995) (arguing for simple rules over more complex legal standards).
3. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th
Cir. 2003) (finding exclusion payments in pharmaceutical patent settlements
illegal per se). But see Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting per se illegality); Schering-Plough Corp., No.
9297, at 96 (FTC June 27, 2002) (same), available at 2002 WL 1488085.
4. He also argues that our proposed rule of presumptive illegality is un-
derinclusive because it does not reach anticompetitive settlements that do not
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substantive justifications for exclusion payments are unpersua-
sive. Second, while he emphasizes that a rule of presumptive
illegality would burden settling firms with transaction costs, he
ultimately favors a solution that would increase, not reduce,
those costs.
involve exclusion payments. See Crane, supra note 1, at 700-02. This argu-
ment is somewhat at cross-purposes with the general thrust of his paper. Most
of his argument is devoted to explaining why the narrow rule of presumptive
illegality we propose will impose significant costs on patentees. See id. at 703-
08. Part I, by contrast, urges broadening that rule, which on his analysis
would presumably increase those costs still more. See id. at 700-02. Perhaps
Crane is attempting a sort of reductio ad absurdum: If you make exclusion
payments illegal, you must make other kinds of settlements illegal, and, there-
fore, courts should throw up their hands and make none of it illegal.
In any event, Crane's argument fails because pharmaceutical exclusion
payments do have significantly different characteristics than any other kind of
settlement. In part, these characteristics result from the odd structure of gov-
ernment regulation in the pharmaceutical industry, in which paying off the
first generic to file an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) can prevent
entry not only by that generic, but also by all subsequent generics as well. In
addition, an exclusion payment aligns the generic's incentives with the pat-
entee's; they are dividing up a monopoly to which the patentee may not have
been entitled. By contrast, other forms of settlement, such as a delayed entry
agreement, do not align the incentives in this way.
Nor is the reduction in payment by the generic that Crane discusses eco-
nomically equivalent to an exclusion payment. An accused infringer would
have to pay damages to the patentee only if it had been selling products in the
marketplace before it was determined to be infringing. See 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2000) (providing that damages shall be awarded in an amount "adequate to
compensate" the patentee for the infringer's past infringement). This virtually
never happens in the pharmaceutical context because the Hatch-Waxman
rules cause litigation to occur before generics are approved by the FDA. If the
accused infringer has been selling products, society will already have benefited
from the uncertainty of the patent during the period of competition. A settle-
ment in which the infringer agrees to depart the market in exchange for a re-
duced damage payment would occur only when the patent looked valid enough
and the infringement had been occurring for long enough that the validity-
discounted value of the damages payment exceeded the expected net present
value to the infringer of continuing to sell in the market. Even then, the pat-
entee would not have an incentive to cut such a deal unless there was reason
to think it could exclude others from entering as well, perhaps because entry
required a long lead time. This confluence of events could happen, but is less
clearly anticompetitive than an exclusion payment.
At the end of the day, Crane is probably right to say in Part I that some
settlements that do not involve exclusion payments are also anticompetitive.
The fact that antitrust law must make a detailed inquiry into the merits of the
patent dispute in those cases, see Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1728
(2003), does not, however, mean that it should make an unnecessary inquiry
into the merits of cases involving exclusion payments. Such an inquiry would
be required only if there were reason to believe that exclusion payments were
good for society. As we discuss in Part I infra, no such case has been made.
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I. ARE EXCLUSION PAYMENTS GOOD FOR SOCIETY?
Crane's article repeats a number of arguments that phar-
maceutical companies and their supporters have made in an ef-
fort to justify the facially anticompetitive practice of paying ge-
neric providers not to enter the market and, in the process, to
exclude others as well . We have explained in detail elsewhere
why exclusion payments are particularly problematic in the
context of Hatch-Waxman litigation.6 Assertions that patentees
are entitled to treat their patents as free from uncertainty, or
that they will not receive the proper incentives unless allowed
to exclude competitors on the basis of dubious patents, simply
misunderstand the structure of the patent system.7 Patents are
not rights to exclude, but to try to exclude, and determining the
validity and scope of a patent is something that we mainly
leave to the courts.8 We will not go over those old disputes
again here.
Crane does offer some purportedly procompetitive justifica-
tions for settlements that involve exclusion payments. None of
his justifications are persuasive. First, Crane argues that dis-
couraging settlements will prolong patent litigation,9 and that
prolonging litigation will "freeze inventive activity for years"
because of uncertainty over whether the infringer can enter the
market. ° He argues that because damage awards normally ex-
5. See Crane, supra note 1, at 705-08.
6. See, e.g., 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 7.4d3
(forthcoming 2004); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 4, at 1749-63.
7. Crane generally avoids falling into this trap, but cannot resist occa-
sional forays in this direction. See Crane, supra note 1, at 705. He suggests
that "[bly severely limiting patent settlements, the authors' rule would un-
dermine a major goal of patent law, that of encouraging investment in innova-
tion." Id. He also argues that the Hovenkamp-Janis-Lemley proposal would
"reduce the value of the patent and therefore the incentive to engage in inven-
tive activity." Id. at 705-06.
8. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34
RAND J. ECON. 391, 391-92 (2003). Mark Lemley has explained elsewhere why
we cannot rely on the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to weed out bad
patents. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U.
L. REV. 1495, 1495-96 (2001). In fact, we do not depend on the PTO, since
forty-six percent of all patents litigated to judgment are declared invalid. John
R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
9. See Crane, supra note 1, at 703-04. We do not agree with his premise.
As we explained in our original article, patentees and accused infringers are
generally free to settle by granting a license, or by delaying entry during the
term of the patent. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 4, at 1760-63.
10. Crane, supra note 1, at 706.
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ceed a defendant's profits in patent cases, infringers will have
an incentive not to enter the market until the litigation is con-
cluded." Crane also asserts that an early settlement will en-
courage the defendant to engage in design-around activity ear-
lier than it otherWise would.
12
We are skeptical that defendants in ordinary patent in-
fringement cases behave as Crane predicts. While Crane may
theorize that potential infringers will stay out of the market for
fear of massive damage liability, that is not the way things
work in the real world. Most patent defendants are unaware of
the patent until after they have started selling goods, in part
because the law encourages them not to read patents. 3 When
they are sued, our experience in litigation makes it abundantly
clear that they do not drop out of the market pending resolu-
tion of the suit. If they engage in design-around activity, they
do so while litigating the suit, rather than waiting until it is re-
solved.
Whatever the problems with the "freezing invention by in-
fringers" argument in general, it is simply nonsensical in the
context of Hatch-Waxman litigation. In Hatch-Waxman cases,
the context in which every exclusion payment case so far has
arisen,"' defendants are generally aware of the patent, because
such patents are listed in the Orange Book. 5 Defendants are
required by law to stay out of the market while patent litiga-
11. See id. at 705-06.
12. See id. at 706.
13. Parties have a duty to avoid infringing patents of which they become
aware or to obtain an opinion of counsel that the patent is invalid. See Under-
water Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). A party who fails to comply with the duty is subject to charges of
willful infringement and the possibility of enhanced damages. See Vulcan Eng.
Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("When it is
found that the infringer acted without a reasonable belief that its actions
would avoid infringement, the patentee has established willful infringement,
which may be accompanied by enhanced damages."). As a result, many com-
panies actively discourage their engineers from reading patents to avoid trig-
gering this duty. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent
Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
14. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 4, at 1751 ("Conceptually, the problem
of exclusion payments can arise whenever the patentee has an incentive to
postpone determination of the validity of its patent. Practically, the problem of
exclusion payments has arisen in antitrust law primarily in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry because of its unique patent rules.").
15. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000) (setting out the listing requirement
for new drug applications (NDAs)). The FDA also publishes the listings. Id.
§ 355(j)(7)(A)(iii).
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tion proceeds and cannot begin selling a pharmaceutical prod-
uct arguably covered by a patent without first giving the pat-
entee an opportunity to file suit.16 The patentee can obtain at
least one, and possibly an unlimited number of mandatory
thirty-month injunctions freezing the defendajit's activity.17 In-
deed, even a generic who wants to design around a patent is
stuck waiting under the Hatch-Waxman system: any product
asserted to be bioequivalent is subject to the stays.'8 We need
not fear that continuing patent litigation will paralyze generic
pharmaceutical defendants into inaction; the law already para-
lyzes them. Furthermore, the settlements Crane defends make
that paralysis permanent, at least during the term of the pat-
ent. The idea that a settlement in which a generic agrees not to
make the patented product or to try to design around that prod-
uct will somehow increase inventive activity by generics is per-
verse.
Crane's second justification for exclusion payments is even
more perverse. He adopts the argument of pharmaceutical pat-
ent owners that restricting settlements will increase barriers to
entry, since entering firms will know that they have to litigate
a suit to judgment rather than settling.' 9 Like his first argu-
ment, this wrongly assumes that prohibiting exclusion pay-
ments will prevent settlement altogether rather than simply
channeling it into other forms.2 ° It also wrongly assumes that
the costs of litigation are a significant percentage of the cost of
entering a market. 21 While patent litigation is not cheap,2 2 it is
16. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
17. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Under the statute, patentees have been able
to obtain an unlimited number of thirty-month stays by sequentially listing
new patents in the Orange Book covering the same product, a practice known
as "evergreening." See, e.g., Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellec-
tual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41
IDEA 227, 239 (2001); Christine S. Paine, Comment, Brand-Name Drug
Manufacturers Risk Antitrust Violations by Slowing Generic Production
Through Patent Layering, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 479, 506-07 (2003); Freder-
ick Tong, Comment, Widening the Bottleneck of Pharmaceutical Patent Exclu-
sivity, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 775, 787-88 (2003). The FDA changed its regula-
tions in June 2003 to permit no more than one thirty-month stay, and to
restrict the ability of patent owners to list packaging or other incidentally re-
lated patents in the Orange Book. See Applications for FDA Approval to Mar-
ket a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676, 36,676-77 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
18. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
19. See Crane, supra note 1, at 706.
20. See id. at 705-06.
21. See id.
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a tiny fraction of the amount of money that is at stake in the
cases we are discussing. More to the point, this justification is
perverse because in the pharmaceutical industry the settle-
ment in question, an exclusion payment, prevents entry alto-
gether, not just by the settling firm, but by any other generic as
well.23 It is hard to see how a settlement indefinitely forbidding
entry by any generic can possibly be justified as a way of reduc-
ing barriers to entry.
Third, Crane argues that if patentees cannot make exclu-
sion payments, they will instead settle by licensing the generic
companies and that licenses may not be procompetitive because
they permit the patentee to control the licensee's price, quan-
tity, or sales territory." Although it is certainly true that some
license agreements have anticompetitive provisions, licensing is
generally a procompetitive practice." Where anticompetitive
provisions do arise, antitrust law can and does deal with them.
They do not justify a blanket ban on licensing. More to the
point, Crane's argument once again fails to account for the re-
alities of the pharmaceutical industry. Whatever the competi-
tive problems with particular license provisions in other indus-
tries, where companies locked in a patent dispute over one
22. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1502 (citing the median cost of litigation
through trial and appeal as $1.5 million per side).
23. This results from a loophole in Hatch-Waxman, which grants generic
exclusivity for 180-days to the first generic company to file an abbreviated new
drug application (ANDA). See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). Thus, if the
first generic company does not enter the market, every other potential entrant
is bottled up behind them.
24. See Crane, supra note 1, at 707.
25. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.3, 5 (1995).
The guidelines state the following:
Licensing, cross-licensing, or otherwise transferring intellectual prop-
erty (hereinafter "licensing") can facilitate integration of the licensed
property with complementary factors of production. This integration
can lead to more efficient exploitation of the intellectual property,
benefiting consumers through the reduction of costs and the introduc-
tion of new products. Such arrangements increase the value of intel-
lectual property to consumers and to the developers of the technology.
By potentially increasing the expected returns from intellectual prop-
erty, licensing also can increase the incentive for its creation and thus
promote greater investment in research and development.
Id; see also DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 136 (2000)
("Licensing usually leads to faster and more complete diffusion of the innova-
tion, including uses outside the original field, possibly leading to new applica-
tions and further innovation.... This allows broader use and increases soci-
ety's returns to the innovation.").
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component may compete with each other in selling other com-
ponents or larger products, a settlement with a license is al-
most certainly better for competition than the alternative of an
exclusion payment, which prevents any generic from entering
the market at all.
Finally, Crane argues that a generic company might injure
the patentee by free riding on its promotional efforts.26 This
concern seems overstated. Unlike a franchise arrangement, for
example, the generic will not be selling products branded with
the patentee's name. Trademark law generally deals ade-
quately with the problem of generics capturing goodwill from
27patent owners. If there are concerns, the patentee could gen-
erally resolve them by licensing; nonprice restrictions designed
to prevent free riding are routinely upheld under the antitrust
laws.28 If the patentee thinks generic competition is so harmful
that no license provisions would suffice, it can choose not to set-
tle and to attempt to exclude the generic company altogether. It
should not have the option, however, to do so if the patent is
invalid or not infringed.
In the end, Crane's objections to presumptive illegality de-
pend on his belief that "many" exclusion payments that exceed
litigation costs are socially desirable. We do not believe he has
proven his case. One can easily give reasons why exclusion
payments are anticompetitive: they invoke a government regu-
lation to exclude all competitors from a market, even in circum-
stances where entry would be likely absent the payments.
Pharmaceutical companies have labored mightily to come up
with good reasons to justify paying generics to stay out of the
market, but neither they nor Crane have come up with a per-
suasive justification. Absent some reason to think a significant
number of procompetitive settlements will be wrongly forbid-
den, presumptive illegality is the right rule.
26. See Crane, supra note 1, at 708.
27. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an
Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002) (explain-
ing how pharmaceutical patent owners can rely on trademarks to differentiate
their products after patent protections expire).
28. See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOvENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw
J$ 1611-19 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining that courts apply a rule of reason to ver-
tical nonprice restrictions).
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II. HOW MUCH INQUIRY SHOULD GO INTO
DETERMINING LITIGATION COSTS?
Crane's other objection to our proposed rule of presumptive
illegality is much narrower. He does not contend that our deci-
sion to limit exclusion payments to litigation costs is wrong.29
Rather, he argues that we are too narrow in our definition of
litigation costs. 30 He would expand the definition to include in-
direct costs such as lost productivity among employees who are
deposed or who search for documents,3' the cost associated with
risk aversion among stockholders, 32 and other unquantified but
no less real costs.
33
Crane is right to suggest that these are real costs of litiga-
tion, and in an ideal world with perfect information our rule
would take account of them. In our rather less than ideal world,
however, the cost and difficulty associated with collecting this
information would prevent it from being worthwhile. Consider
three points: First, the costs that he identifies, while real, are
difficult if not impossible to quantify. Legal fees are billed by
the hour, and out-of-pocket expenditures are fairly easy to es-
timate. It is harder (though not impossible) to estimate em-
ployee time diverted into the lawsuit, and harder still to try to
quantify the effect of risk aversion on corporate behavior and
shareholder value. Under Crane's approach courts would have
to quantify these things in determining the legality of a settle-
ment, but there is no reason to believe courts will do a particu-
larly good job of valuing these intangible costs.
Second, if courts expand the litigation costs calculus to in-
clude intangible losses a company might suffer from litigation,
it is far too tempting to add impermissible "costs" into the mix.
Risk aversion is an obvious example.34 It is true that the cost of
risk aversion should be considered a cost of litigation for which
a generic might want to be compensated. Uncertainty itself, by
contrast, is not a permissible value in exclusion payments.35 If a
patent is worth $1000 if valid, and is sixty percent likely to be
29. See Crane, supra note 1, at 703-05.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 703-04.
32. Id. at 704.
33. See id. at 704-05.
34. Id. at 704 (arguing that risk aversion could be considered a cost of
continued litigation).
35. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 4, at 1760 n.177 (explaining that
uncertainty should not be included as a value in exclusion payments).
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valid, the expected value of the patent is $600. Risk aversion
might reduce that value to $550. A proper calculation of indi-
rect litigation costs to include in an exclusion payment could
take account of the $50 in risk aversion, but could not take ac-
count of the $400 by which the uncertainty of the outcome re-
duced the value of the patent. That $400 is not part of the value
of the patent, and it is precisely what the patentee is attempt-
ing to capture by entering into an anticompetitive settlement.
In theory, courts could calculate the expected values with and
without risk aversion and determine the proper size of an ex-
clusion payment accordingly. In practice, that will never hap-
pen, in part because it is too tempting to call any uncertainty a
"cost" of litigation.6
Finally, including unquantifiable indirect litigation costs
will make it virtually impossible for the parties to a settlement
to know ex ante whether or not their settlement is legal. Legal-
ity can be determined under Crane's proposal only by waiting
to see how risk averse an agency or court thinks the parties are
and what value it puts on lost productivity. If Crane is truly
concerned with the transaction costs that a legal rule will im-
pose on patentees, he should favor the bright-line rule of pre-
sumptive illegality we propose rather than a legal standard
that casts a cloud of uncertainty over a wide range of legal set-
tlements.
III. ALLOCATING THE COSTS OF UNCERTAINTY
Crane argues that our presumptive illegality rule will in-
crease uncertainty in patent litigation. Ironically, however,
Crane's own approach will create far more uncertainty than
ours. He does not argue for a rule of per se legality, and indeed
seems at various points to acknowledge that exclusion pay-
ments may sometimes be anticompetitive. Instead, he appears
to favor a case-by-case analysis of the merits of each patent suit
and the cost structure of both parties in order to decide
whether a particular exclusion payment was warranted.37 This
36. Indeed, Crane himself falls into this trap, suggesting that we should
include losses to the patentee that result from "making marketing, research
and development, and other business planning difficult while the outcome of
the case remains uncertain." Crane, supra note 1, at 704. For a similar argu-
ment against per se illegality of settlement agreements, see Robert D. Willig &
John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Towards Agreements That Settle Patent
Litigation (manuscript, on file with authors).
37. See Crane, supra note 1, at 708-10.
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inquiry will be more intrusive than simply litigating the patent
suit to conclusion: under Crane's regime, settling parties will
have to litigate the merits of the patent suit along with their
indirect costs and a host of other antitrust issues before anti-
trust agencies and appellate courts with no particular expertise
in evaluating patent disputes. Crane invites us to imagine be-
ing in-house counsel and having to explain to senior manage-
ment "that by settling a patent infringement lawsuit they will
presumptively become criminals.., unless they can persuade a
jury that they likely would have won the patent infringement
lawsuit anyway."38 Every proposal, including Crane's, however,
will place this burden on patentees who enter into a settlement
involving an exclusion payment. Our proposal differs from the
others only in that it makes the rules clear up front.
Presumptive illegality will, it is true, discourage the use of
exclusion payments. If Crane is right that we are not properly
accounting for litigation costs, it may even overdeter their use.
Antitrust rules, however, are all about comparing error costs.
Neither Crane nor anyone else has offered any real reason to
believe that exclusion payments serve any significant social
purpose, such that we should worry about overdeterring them.
38. Id. at 709.

